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Abstract
Many overlooked the fact that politico-economic factors played an important 
role behind the 2011 and 2012 Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang Madura. 
Some, however, argue that the Sunni-Shi’ah conflict was merely driven by 
theological factors. The major roots of  the conflict thus were therefore the internal 
dimensions of  religious beliefs as contained in its doctrines. As a result, the 
conflict can only be explained in terms of  religious and theological framework. 
This assumption is commonly shared by the majority of  Madurese Muslims 
by arguing that the island of  Madura cannot host the believers of  non-Sunni. 
In the aftermath of  the conflict, the community of  Shi’ah has been forced to 
seek refuge outside of  the land of  Madura. By doing so, many observers and 
the Madurese Muslims tends to have treated political and economic factors as 
peripheral that exacerbated the escalation of  conflict. This article, however, 
argues vice-versa that it is not theology, but politics and economy, which mainly 
steered the conflict. Theology played a role in exacerbating the escalation of  
conflict. During the conflict, religious and theological arguments were deployed 
as a mobilizing force in order to justify the conflict. Furthermore, the existence 
of  Shi’ah community in Sampang is regarded by the mainstream Sunni 
community as a threat to their long domination over the socio-political structure 
in that region. The paper, thus, perceives the conflict as the way the local elites 
maintain the established mode of  production. This paper is qualitative research 
that employs political-economy as its main approach in analyzing the data. 
1 The earlier version of  this draft was presented at the Eighth Al-Jami’ah 
International Conference in Collaboration with Kyoto University: “Revisiting Sunni 
and Shi’ah: Thoughts, Spirituality, and Movements,” Yogyakarta, 6-8 November 2015.
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[Para pengamat banyak tidak melihat aktor politik dan ekonomi di balik 
konflik Sunni dan Syiah 2011 dan 2012 di Sampang Madura. Para peneliti 
bahkan beranggapan bahwa konflik Sunni-Syiah itu dilatari oleh faktor 
teologis. Ini artinya bahwa tiap kelompok memegang sistem kepercayaan yang 
berbeda. Akar utama dari konflik itu pada persoalan agama dan doktrinnya 
yang menyebabkan konflik. Walhasil, konflik hanya bisa dijelaskan dari 
kerangka keagamaan dan teologis. Asumsi ini banyak dipegang oleh mayoritas 
Muslim Madura dengan berasalan bahwa orang Madura tidak menerima 
selain Sunni, termasuk Syiah. Setelah konflik, masyarakat Syiah dipaksa 
untuk mengungsi ke luar pulau Madura. Dengan begitu, banyak pengamat 
dan juga masyarakat Muslim Madura melihat faktor politis dan ekonomi 
hanya pinggiran yang memperparah konflik. Artikel ini beranggapan 
sebaliknya, bahwa politis dan ekonomi merupakan faktor utama. Teologi 
hanya memperparah saja. Pada saat konflik, faktor teologis dan agamis 
digunakan sebagai kekuatan untuk mobilisasi dan menjustifikasinya. 
Selanjutnya, keberadaan komunitas Syiah di Sampang dianggap sebagai 
ancaman bagi dominasi Sunni pada struktur sosio politis daerah itu. Artikel 
ini menganggap bahwa konflik hanyalah sebagai sarana elit lokal untuk 
mempertahankan dominasi sistem ekonomi. Makalah ini pada dasarnya 
merupakan penelitian kualitatif  yang melihat faktor politis ekonomis sebagai 
pendekatan dan analisis data.]
Keywords: Sunni-Shi’ah conflict, Sampang, Madura, socio-political 
factors, economic factors
A. Introduction
The Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang has drawn a significant 
attention of  some scholars. However, most of  these scholarly works 
have overwhelmingly put their emphasis on cultural perspective to the 
conflict by arguing that the conflict is ideological-theological in nature, 
not economic-political factor.2 Despite the fact that such an assumption 
might applicable in explaining part of  the conflict, it contains weaknesses. 
First, if  it is about ideological-theological conflict, why is it not the case 
in other parts of  the society, especially in some cities such as Jember and 
Pasuruan, East Java, where the Sunni and Shi’ah communities coexist 
2 See Slamet Muliono, “Syi’ah dan Masyarakat Lokal Sampang: Studi tentang 
Militansi Pengungsi Syi’ah dan Dinamika Masyarakat Lokal Sampang”, Research Report 
(Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2014).
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peacefully. Unlike in Sampang Madura, both communities in those areas 
avoid conflict. 
Second, the Shi’ah community in Sampang in particular and Madura 
in general exite for a log time. It has been reported that both comunities 
can live together side by side since at least in the past two decades or so 
assumed. This proves that differences in ideology and theology cannot 
be as the main cause of  the conflict. It is illogical that both communities 
are in conflict simply because of  theological differences. There must 
be other factors beyond ideology and theology that drives conflict. 
Therefore, pointing the ideological-theological factor as the main cause 
of  the conflict is simply an exaggeration. 
This paper seeks to analyze the Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang 
Madura, seeing political economy factor; the writer perceives the conflict 
as the way the local elites maintain the established mode of  production. 
In this case, the existence of  Shi’ah community in Sampang is regarded by 
the mainstream Sunni community as a threat to their long domination over 
the socio-political structure in that region. Furthermore, the conflict was 
part of  a larger scheme of  electoral politics at the expense of  the state’s 
omission act towards the conflict which in the end favors the mainstream 
Sunni community. The reason for the state’s political favoritism is clear: 
kiais in Madura are the vote-gatherers who have paved the way for the 
victory of  Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf  in the past two provincial elections 
(2008 & 2013) as the governor-vice-governor of  East Java.
B. Sampang: Socio-religious Life
Sampang is one of  the four regencies of  Madura, in addition to 
Bangkalan, Pamekasan, and Sumenep, located between 6°05’ and 7°13’ 
on the south latitude and between 113°08’ and 113°39’ east longitude. It 
consists of  1,233,30 km2 wide, located around 100 km from Surabaya to 
the east. It is adjacent to Bangkalan regency to the west, Pamekasan to 
the east, as well as Java Sea to the north and Madura strait to the south. 
Unlike Java where the majority of  its land is suitable for paddy agriculture, 
most of  the land in Madura in general and Sampang in particular is barren 
which is not suited for agriculture.3 
This geographical condition is exacerbated by the low rate of  
rainfall during the year, which forces people to find alternative ways to 
3 For further account on this, see, Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat 
Agraris Madura 1850-1940 (Jogjakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002); especially the chapter 2.
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sustain economic life outside agriculture. This condition creates poverty 
in most of  Sampang area, especially in the area of  conflict, futher 
deteriorated by the steadily population growth. Some of  the papulation 
prefer to go outside of  Sampang for migration,4 such as Surabaya and 
Jakarta, among the most favorite cities to which the community of  
Sampang mostly is heading. A significant number of  Sampang community 
goes to other island such as Kalimantan and even Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia as the destination for making better life. 
Viewed from several key indicators, such as poverty index, Human 
Development Index (HDI), income per capita, Sampang is the lowest 
compared to other three regencies in Madura: Sumenep, Bangkalan 
and Pamekasan. First of  all, based on the data released by The Centre 
for Statistical Bureau (Biro Pusat Statistik/BPS) in 2007, Sampang 
comprises the poorest regency in Madura with the income per capita 
Rp. 4.789.960,00 the second lowest after Pamekasan (Rp. 4.615.107,00). 
Secondly, the HDI of  Sampang is the lowest with the following order: 
Sumenep (62,15), Bangkalan (61,94), Pamekasan (61,62), and Sampang 
(55,77).5 
Socio-religiously speaking, the majority of  Madurese community 
is Muslim, only a small minority are non-Muslims. The religious identity 
of  Madurese community is identical with that of  Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 
It is reported that no single Madurese Muslim converts to non-Islam. 
The non-Muslim Madurese therefore is not of  Madura origin.6 They are 
usually not Madura-born origins and become Madurese due to migration 
to the island. Being a Muslim in Madura, including in Sampang, is a 
matter of  symbolic identity rather than a substantive piety. Religion in its 
symbolic sense occupies the most significant aspect of  Madurese culture. 
Insulting Islam in this context can be translated into insulting the very 
idenity of  being Madurese, but not the other way around.
There are abundant religious festivals throughout the year as the 
standard of  symbolic pietism among the Madurese community. They 
have a great deal of  traditional rituals such as Slametan for memorizing 
the deceased ancestors which are usually held in every Thursday night 
4 Huub de Jonge, Garam, Kekerasan dan Aduan Sapi: Esai-esai tentang Orang Madura 
dan Kebudayaan Madura (Yogyakarta: LKiS Group, 2012), pp. 77–10.
5 Biro Pusat Statistik, Sampang dalam Angka (Sampang: BPS Kab. Sampang, 2008).
6 Imam Bonjol Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura: Studi Gerakan Protes 
Islam Sunni terhadap Ideologi Syi’ah di Sampang”, Master Thesis (Surabaya: UIN Sunan 
Ampel Surabaya, 2014), p. 114, http://digilib.uinsby.ac.id/1213/, accessed 28 Sep 2015.
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(malam Jumat). There are other festivals of  Slametan for venerating the sufi 
figures such as Qadiriyah founder, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the Slametan 
for venerating the death of  Hussein, the grandson of  the Prophet, the 
veneration of  Abu Bakar in the month of  Safar in the Hijriyah calendar. 
In the month of  Rabi’ul Awwal there is a bigger Slametan festival for 
venerating the birth of  the Prophet. In the next month, Rabi’ul Akhir, 
there is another Slametan called sedekah arosol (almsgiving for the Prophet). 
On the 27 Rajab there is Slametan for celebrating Isra’ Mi’raj (the heavenly 
ascendant of  the Prophet to receive the five-daily prayers from God). 
During the month of  Sya’ban the villagers hold a night long festival to 
raise prayers asking for prosperity, health and good life.7
In addition to religious function, those festivals play a central role 
in strengthening the social solidarity among the community. Kiais and 
santris are of  the important figures behind all of  those festivals without 
whom the festivals are meaningless. They give meanings to all of  those 
festivals through their skills in leading the rituals which are mostly 
recited in Arabic language. Due to their expertise in leading rituals and 
festivals, kiais receive cabisan (enveloped money) as the charity given by 
the community. The rituals and festivals even serve as the income source 
for kiais, giving them an important economic buffer zone which can 
support financially the existence of  pesantren and their families.8
Culturally speaking, the ethic Madurese has its own unique culture 
that adopts a patrimonialistic culture. Under such a culture, each person 
obys the most respected persons in the society as follows: buppa’, babbu, 
guru, rato (father, mother, teacher and the man of  government).9 Upon 
those figures every Madurese must rest his/her allegiance hierarchically 
that creates routine and normative cultural tradition. For a Madurese, to 
live properly means that one can hardly avoid such a cultural tradition, 
forming a collective framework for action that binds every Madurese 
as a collective idenity without which a Maduree person means nothing. 
Violation of  such a value will result in a social and cultural punishment 
in the society.
7 Ibid.
8 Syamsul Arifin and Muhammad Junaedi, “Konstruksi Sosial Masyarakat 
Syi’ah dan Sunni di Sampang, Madura”, in Hak Asasi Manusia untuk Kebebasan Beragama 
dan Berkeyakinan di Indonesia: Keniscayaan, Kenyataan dan Penguatan, ed. by Syamsul Arifin 
(Madang: Pusat Studi Agama dan Multikulturalisme [PUSAM] Program Pascasarjana 
UMM, 2014), p. 350.
9 A. Latief  Wiyata, Carok: Konflik Kekuasaan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002).
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C. Non-governing Elite: Position of  Kiai
It is under such a scheme that kiai (religious person, mostly from 
pesantren) plays a cetral role in the socio-religious life of  Madura.10 The 
position of  kiai in this context is parallel to that of  guru in the hierarchy 
of  obedience. The obedience to religious guru, i.e. kiai, weighs more than 
a non-religious guru. It is due to this reason that more people in Madura 
are willing to send their children to pesantren (or madrasah) rather than in 
secular schools. Pesantren or madasah is considered to be able to salvage 
their children in this world and the hereafter. That is why almost everyone 
in Madura is happily associated with anything related to pesantren.
Within the structure of  Madura’s socio-cultural tradition, kiai and 
blater (thug) are two most respected figures in each domain. While kiais 
are respected because they are regarded as the heirs of  the Prophet and 
the source of  religious truth, blaters are respected for their strength, 
skills and intelligence in building domination over the rest of  society. 
In Rozaki’s words, both can be described as “twin regimes” in Madura. 
Both are influential in building and maintaining the socio-political web 
of  power in the society. In doing so, both can go hand-in-hand in a 
team fied by a common interest among them.11 
From the description above, it can be understood that the position 
of  kiai forms a hierarchy of  elite in the leadership of  Madurese community. 
He is respected by the community because of  his charisma in Weberian 
sense.12 The level of  his charisma increases as kiai enters the reality of  
formal state instittution such as a regent or a member of  legislative body, 
for instance. This is the case with the regents of  Bangkalan, Sampang and 
Sumenep where the regents are kiais.13 In this case, they can accumulate 
10 For further information of  the kiai’s role in Madura, see Abdur Rozaki, 
Menabur Kharisme Menuai Kuasa: Kiprah Kiai dan Blater sebagai Rezim Kembar di Madura 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa, 2004).
11 Abdur Rozaki, “The Social Origins and Political Power of  Blaters (Thugs) 
in Madura”, Kyoto Review of  Southeast Asia (12 Nov 2009), http://kyotoreview.org/
issue-11/the-social-origins-and-political-power-of-blaters-thugs-in-madura/, accessed 
28 Oct 2015.
12 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, ed. by S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago 
and London: The Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 284–94.
13 Almost all regents in Madura are kiai or associated with pesantren background. 
Makmun Ibnu Fu’ad, the regent of  Bangkalan and the son of  the former regent of  
Bangkalan, Fu’ad Amin Imron, is the great grandchild of  Syaikhona Kholil, the grand 
syaikh for almost all kiais in Java. Abuya Busyro Karim, the current regent of  Sumenep, 
is also kiai from pesantren background. He himself  leads the Pesantren Al-Karimiyah 
Gapura Sumenep. Fannan Hasib, the current regent of  Sampang, is also kiai in his 
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the power of  the two sources: formal-authoritative power source and 
non-formal spiritual one. Despite the fact that the regent of  Pamekasan 
is not kiai, he is well supported by pesantrens. This indicates that religious 
authorities do matter for the majority of  Madurese Muslims. 
Following Pareto’s theoretical framework, kiai and bureaucratic 
figures comprise the elite of  the community.14 While the regents can 
be classified as the ruling elite, the kiais are non-governing one. In the 
structure of  Madura’s social tradition, the relationship between the lay 
persons and their elites forms a hierarchical as well as patrimonialitic 
pattern of  loyalty. Particularly in matters of  religion, the loyalty of  the 
lay persons to their kiais is not optional; it is a must and non-negotiable 
one. It is of  a common belief  among the Madurese that—following the 
Prophetic saying—the kiais are the heirs of  the Prophet. Along with this 
common belief, the Madurese community imagines the kiais to have the 
highest position in the hierarchy of  social structure, whose legal opinions 
on religious matters are binding people. 
As the non-governing elite, kiai sometimes expands his role in the 
society beyond his traditional role as religious leader. He gives patronage 
to his former students in economic business or politics. By this definition, 
it does not necessarily mean that the kiai has dropped his traditional role 
as religious leader in society. With such an expanded role, the position of  
kiai is stronger in society. The expansion of  the role of  kiai is possible 
due particularly to the fact that the former students usually maintain their 
relationship with their kiai even after graduation. The former students 
usually rely on his kiai as the spiritual advisor for their worldly affairs in 
return for economic or financial support for the pesantren. As a result, 
graduates of  pesantren serve as one of  the financial sources that sustain 
its fondation.15
Another form of  expansion in the role of  kiai in Madura can 
also be seen from the involvement of  kiai in local electoral politics. 
The involvement of  kiai can be two forms: direct and indirect types. In 
the case of  direct involvement, some kiais in Madura run for a regent 
or member of  the parliament. The electoral democracy makes the 
region. It is only Ahmad Syafi’i, the current regent of  Pamekasan, who is not kiai, but 
has a close relationship with pesantren in Pamekasan.
14 Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of  Elites: an Application of  Theoretical Sociology 
(London: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 42–58.
15 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah Sampang Madura: Telaah Fenomenologis 
terhadap Patrimonialisme Budaya Politik”, Master Thesis (Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel 
Surabaya, 2014), p. 57, http://digilib.uinsby.ac.id/1328/, accessed 28 Sep 2015.
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relationship between politics and the world of  kiai or pesantren becomes 
closer. The personality of  kiai, to a greater extent, helps to boost his 
victory in local electoral contests even though it is not an absolute 
guarantee.
In the case of  indirect kiai’s involvement, the position of  kiai is 
usually exploited by the elites of  political parties as the vote-gatherers 
during the local elections. They are not running for themselves; rather, 
they give their political support for particular candidates who run in 
the election. The kiai’s involvement of  this type might not be driven by 
economic or political motifs. Ideological motif  sometimes drives the 
kiai’s involvement in the local politics. They exert whatever necessary to 
help candidates to win the election. The kiais are behind the scene who 
support particular candidates whose ideology is leanings are in line with 
the kiai’s interests. What is meant by the ideological motif  in this context is 
kiai’s imagination about an ideal community based on religious arguments. 
D. Shi’ah Community in Sampang
The Shi’ah community in Sampang had not existed until the family 
of  Makmun, a local kiai in the village Karang Gayam, Sub-district Omben, 
Sampang, introduced this sect within a limited circle—his family and his 
surrounding—in the 1980s.16 He was reportedly impressed by the 1979 
Islamic revolution in Iran and admired its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
particularly in relation to his effort in toppling down the previous regime 
of  Syah Reza Pahlevi. This motivates him to learn more about anything 
related to Shi’ah and its teachings. Makmun was nevertheless aware that 
teaching Shi’ah in to his surroundings would be mission impossible due 
to the fanatic subscription of  the community to Sunni (NU) in general.
As it has been, and still is, the case, that the community of  Madura 
is characterized by patrimonialism in almost areas of  life, particularly in 
religion. The community leaders are respected due to their charisma, 
which is handed down hereditarily from generation to generation. They 
are respected because of  traditional charisma, not their intellectual 
capacity. This situation has been Makmun’s concern. In his view, such a 
leadership will not result in the betterment of  society; it will instead cause 
the accumulation of  power and wealth in limited family of  kiai. They 
are not concerned with the poor condition of  society; poverty, illiteracy, 
16 Arifin and Junaedi, “Konstruksi Sosial Masyarakat Syi’ah”, pp. 345–46; Jatim, 
“Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 54; Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, p. 122.
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and other social illnesses.
The uneasiness of  Makmun grew when he saw the backwardness 
was everywhere in Sampang. In his opinion, the community suffered from 
backwardness in all aspects of  life as a result of  hereditary leadership 
which did not accommodate merit-based leadership. The first type 
of  leadership is concerned with private interests of  power and wealth 
accumulation. They are not concerned about the interest of  public life. 
The possibility of  vertical mobilization among the kiais to be formal 
leaders such as regent is higher than the lay community or those with 
no pesantren background. They usually use their biological factor as a 
stepping stone towards such a mobilization.17 The social condition above 
motivates Makmun to transform the society through religious reform, 
and he sees Shi’ah as one of  the liberating forces. 
From the beginning, Makmun did not spread his Shi’ah ideology 
openly. As an initial stage, in 1983 he sent his four kids—Iklil Milal, Tajul 
Muluk, Roisul Hukama and Ummi Hani—to study in Yayasan Pesantren 
Islam (YAPI), a Shi’ah-affiliated pesantren in Bangil Pasuruan. YAPI is 
a pesantren that adopts Shi’ah Ja’fariyah school of  thought. Makmun’s 
children graduated from this pesantren in 1991. Of  these four, it is only 
Tajul Muluk who continued his study in Saudi Arabia in 1993. Due to 
funding problem, he finally dropped out from his school but continued 
to live there as a worker and went back to Indonesia in 1999.
Upon his arrival in Indonesia, he lived in sub-village (Dusun) 
Nangkernang, the village Karang Gayam, Sampang. Makmun’s family 
and the community of  surroundings welcomed him. One of  Makmun’s 
students endowed his piece of  land to Makmun’s family for building 
a pesantren. In 2004 the people who were taught by Tajul Muluk were 
hand in hand in building his house which functions as pesantren as well, 
equipped with a praying house (mushalla) and several classrooms for 
instruction. This small pesantren was named “Misbahul Huda,” and the 
teachers were Tajul Muluk and his brothers and sister who studied in the 
Pesantren YAPI Bangil.18 
Different from his father, Makmun, who taught his family and the 
surrounding community in secrecy (taqiyah), Tajul Muluk took an open 
approach in teaching Shi’ah to the wider community. Tajul is friendly 
and generous in assisting his fellow humans in need, as well as his 
option not to receive money (cabisan) from the community after giving 
17 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 56.
18 Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, pp. 123–24.
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religious sermons, makes him as a young popular preacher who appeals 
sympathy and support from wider audience. This makes him easier to 
propagate Shi’ah thoughts to the public. It is only within three years, a 
significant number of  people in Karang Gayam, his village, and Blu’uran, 
neighboring village, has become his loyal followers. Up to 2011, when 
the conflict exploded, there are 584 Shi’ah followers in his region.19
The development of  Tajul Muluk’s propagation was finally 
responded by the local kiai. It is Ali Karrar Shinhaji, the leader of  
Pesantren Daut Tauhid, Desa Lenteng, the Sub-District of  Proppo, 
Pamekasan, who is also Makmun’s close relative, gave response to Tajul 
Muluk’s Shi’ah missionary. For Karrar, Shi’ah is a defiant sect in Islam. 
A lot of  fellow kiais showed the same response to Tajul Muluk. They 
however could not stop Tajul Muluk’s activities because they paid homage 
to his father, Makmun, who passed away in 2004. After Makmun passed 
away, there was nobody who gave direct protection to Tajul Muluk’s 
activities. 
E. Waves of  Resistance
As Tajul Muluk had wider audience, resistance from the rest 
of  the community, especially from religious elites, starts to appear. 
Following David G. Bromley (2002), as quoted by Arifin & Junaedi, 
the resistance has undergone three major stages; latent tension, nascent 
conflict, and intensified conflict.20 At the first stage, conflict takes the 
form of  misunderstanding and prejudices between the two parties. In 
the context of  Shi’ah community in Sampang, the period 2004 to 2011 
can be classified as the latent tension where the followers of  Shi’ah and 
the opponents were in lurking to one another in prejudices. 
In the middle 2005, Ali Karrar Shinhaji held a big religious gathering 
(pengajian) in the village Karang Gayam which was reportedly attended by 
thousands of  audience and kiais in the Sub-District Omben Sampang. 
This gathering was designed as counterbalance to the propagation of  
Shi’ah carried out by Tajul Muluk and his family in the same area. Even 
though in this pengajian Ali Karrar did not use sarcastic and provocative 
speech in admonishing the Shi’ah as a defiant set, he already warned the 
audience that there was a threat from Shi’ah in that area. Since then, the 
news about the existence of  Shi’ah in the village Karang Gayam has soon 
19 Ibid., p. 187.
20 Arifin and Junaedi, “Konstruksi Sosial Masyarakat Syi’ah”, p. 345.
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spread over the public in the Sub-District Omben Sampang.21
The provocation of  hate speech against the Tajul Muluk-led Shi’ite 
community was since then intensified. On 26 February 2006, a meeting 
among the kiais of  Madura initiated by Kiai Ali Karrar Shinhaji was held 
under the organization of  BASRA (Badan Silaturahmi Ulama se Madura).22 
This meeting was also attended by the head of  regent Fadilah Budiono 
and the head of  Ministry of  Religious Affairs Sampang, Imron Rosyidi. 
This meeting was held at the house of  Sya’bi (local elite of  Omben), 
designed as an “inquisition” of  Shi’ah ideology in Sampang. For this 
purpose, Tajul Muluk was invited to clarify all accusations against Shi’ah 
as a defiant sect. In that meeting, Tajul came with his followers bringing 
all references to deliver to the attendance, but all kiais seemed to make 
this meeting to force Tajul to return to Sunni Islam (NU) and stop all 
his activities in propagating Shi’ah. Tajul was given a week to answer the 
ultimatum.23
The next meeting was held a week later, on 5 March, 2006, by Abdul 
Wahhab Adnan, a local kiai together with the head of  The Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI) Sampang, Kiai Mubassyir and the head of  Police 
office of  Omben. The meeting took place in at the mosque Landeko’ 
Karang Gayam, the house of  Tajul Muluk’s grandfather, Kiai Nawawi. 
This meeting was attended by Tajul Muluk and it was formally entitled 
Forum Musyawarah Ulama (FMU). All participants listened to Tajul 
Muluk’s answer about the existence of  Shi’ah. Tajul used the meeting to 
defend his belief  that Shi’ah is not a defiant sect and he argued that it is 
widely acknowledged in the world of  Islam. He was not willing to quit 
his belief  in Shi’ah.24 
As the FMU failed to convert Tajul Muluk into Sunni, this forum 
has come into decision as follows:
To urge the leader of  Shi’ah Ja’fariyah, Tajul Muluk, to convert to Ahl 
al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah and the pious predecessors in order to avoid 
the physical and ideological clash among the community which is likely 
to happen. And because Tajul Muluk has rejected all offers given by 
FMU, then FMU did not take any responsibility to whatever can happen 
and render instead this problem to the concerned institution. FMU 
recommends the MUI in four Districts in Madura release a legal opinion 
21 Interview with Iklil al-Milal, Sidoarjo, 12 April 2014.
22 Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, p. 139.
23 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 65.
24 Ibid., p. 66.
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(fatwa) on the danger of  defiant sects, including Shi’ah that questions the 
authenticity of  the Qur’an, the righteousness of  Sahabat (Companions 
of  the Prophet) and exaggeration in ahl al-bait (the Prophet family).25
In April 2007, on a mawlid (the commemoration of  the 
Prophet’s date of  birth) season, Tajul Muluk invited the community to 
commemorate the mawlid in the village mosque, in order not to burden the 
community, especially the have-nots. The mawlid festivals in the village are 
usually carried out in every house by inviting the kiai or teachers (ustaz) 
to give religious sermons. According to Tajul, this tradition is of  course 
burdensome for the community. For the poor, sometimes they have to 
borrow some money to finance the ritual. The mawlid season becomes 
the harvest time for local kiais because each house is in a competition 
to invite speakers from kiais or ustaz and they have to give cabisan to the 
kiais at least Rp. 50.000,00 for each kiai. This has become the tradition of  
Muslim community in Sampang, not only in the village Karang Gayam 
and Blu’uran.26
Since Tajul sees the mawlid tradition is burdensome, he initiated a 
unified commemoration of  the mawlid festival in a single mosque which 
is supported by most members of  the community collectively. Tajul’s 
idea of  holding a unified mawlid festival was spread over the community 
outside of  the village. In response to Tajul’s idea, the community was 
provoked to block the ways to the mosque by bringing weapons such as 
sickles (celurit) and wooden sticks (pentungan). They besieged all accesses 
and blockaded all roods to the village Karang Gayam. In order to avoid 
physical clash, troops from TNI and police were deployed to safeguard 
the house of  Tajul Muluk. The mawlid festival was finally held, but only 
attended by limited family members and pupils of  Tajul Muluk.27
In response to all Tajul Muluk’s activities, a bigger meeting was 
initiated on 26 October 2009 involving MUI Sampang, PCNU Sampang, 
the Chairman of  DPRD Sampang, the Chairman of  Depag Sampang, 
Bakesbangpol (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik) Sampang and a great 
number of  kiais in Sampang. This meeting was held at the office of  Police 
Sampang. This meeting produced five points signed by Tajul Muluk:
First, Tajul Muluk is not allowed to carry out rituals and propagation 
25 “Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi’ah Sampang”, Report, 
(Surabaya: Kontras), p. 4, http://kontras.org/data/Laporan%20Investigasi%20
Syiah%20di%20Sampang.pdf, accessed 17 Sep 2015.
26 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 66.
27 Interview with Mulyono, 20 April 2014.
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activities related to Shi’ah because this has brought troublesome for 
the community. Second, Tajul Muluk is not willing to carry out rituals, 
propagation and dissemination of  the sect in the District Sampang. Third, 
if  he keeps carrying out the rituals and propagation activities Tajul Muluk 
is willing to be brought to justice. Fourth, the institutions of  MUI, NU 
and NGOs in the District Sampang will keep eye on the sect. Fifth, the 
organizations of  MUI, NU and NGOs in the District Sampang are ready 
to curb the chaotic situation in the community dialogically and anarchically 
as long as Tajul Muluk has obeyed the points 1 and 2.28
However, the letter of  agreement made on 26 October 2009 seems 
ineffective because it cannot stop all Tajul Muluk’s activities. He keeps 
observing and teaching Shi’ite to the public. Due to this reason, the kiais 
and community sent a letter to the Regent of  Sampang, the head of  police 
office of  Sampang, the Chairman of  local parliament and the head of  
district court Sampang, signed by tens of  local kiais and hundreds of  
community leaders. 
In response to that letter, the head of  office Sampang invited all 
those who signed the letter on 11 April 2011 and Indonesia’s general 
headquarter of  police (Mabes Polri) in the Pesantren Darul Ulum 
Gersempal, Omben, Sampang. The meeting came to the following 
agreements: 1) Tajul Muluk has to leave from Madura; 2) He must not 
campaign his Shi’ite teachings to the community of  Madura; 3) All of  
his followers must return to the Sunni (NU) religious gatherings in order 
to be trained over again. Related to this agreement, on 28 May 2011, the 
MUI of  Madura held a meeting resulting in the following two points: 
1) to stop all activities of  Shi’ah in Karang Gayam; and 2) recommend 
that Tajul Muluk as the leader of  Shi’ite community to move to Malang, 
precisely in Lembah Dieng Block N2, Malang city.29
The resistance of  kiais and community in Madura to the Shi’ah 
community reaches its culmination on 29 December 2011, when the 
Pesantren Darul Huda as the center for Tajul Muluk’s activities in the 
sub-village Nangkernang, village Karang Gayam, Omben, Sampang, 
was finally burnt by the masses. All properties of  the house and building 
were flatted with the ground. The masses came from five villages in 
Omben, none of  whom thus far brought to trial. 
As a result of  this persecution, 306 members of  the Shi’ah 
community were evacuated to the office of  the Sub-district Omben. 
28 “Laporan Investigasi”, p. 5.
29 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 69.
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Since the office cannot accommodate the refugees properly, they were 
evacuated again to the sport center of  Sampang. Most of  the refugees 
were dominated by female and children. The total number of  Shi’ah 
followers in the sub-village Nangkernang is 584 persons or 135 heads of  
family.30 It means that the evacuation was not carried out to all members 
of  Shi’ah community in that sub-village. In that persecution, nobody 
was injured nor killed because the masses only targeted the physical 
buildings, not humans.
The persecution of  Shi’ah community does not stop there. A 
bigger scale of  persecution occurred on 26 August 2012 that claimed 
lives of  the Shi’ah community. At around 8 o’clock, a great number of  
masses armed with sharp weapons such as celurit and swords, as well as 
wooden sticks, have gathered at Nangkernang to blockade the departure 
of  the Shi’ah community children to some pesantrens outside Sampang 
such as Bangil Pasuruan and Pekalongan, Central Java. The persecution 
has claimed one life of  the Shi’ah follower, Hamama (50 years) and ten 
others were critically injured. The masses also burnt 48 houses of  the 
Shi’ah followers. This persecution also resulted in the loss of  properties 
and cattle which was confiscated by the anti-Shi’ah masses. 
This time the police arrested the persecutors and brought them to 
trial. The provincial court of  Surabaya has pronounced varied sentences 
of  imprisonment to them from 6 months to 4 years depending on the 
degree of  crime they have perpetrated. As a result of  this persecution, 
and in order to avoid the claim of  more lives, 168 Shi’ah followers were 
finally evacuated to Puspa Agro Sidoarjo. This evacuation was facilitated 
by the local government of  Sampang and the provincial government 
of  East Java employing 3 police trucks and 2 buses, accompanied by 3 
escort cars.31
F. The Economy of  Conflict: Maintaining the Established Mode 
of  Production
At the surface to society’s structure, one may find the Shi’ah-Sunni 
conflict as an ideological contest between the two. However, when 
scrutinized more deeply, the conflict follows the structure of  production 
mode wrapped in the argument of  cultural essentialism, as though culture 
30 Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, p. 187.
31 Ibid., p. 189.
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does matter for each conflicting party.32 In line with this argument, on the 
surface of  the structure it seems that they are in conflict because each 
holds different cultural and ideological values which are irreconcilable. 
The ideological issues raised by the mainstream community, among 
others, is the difference in theology and interpretation to the sacred texts: 
the Quran and Hadith.33 
In addition to theological factors, one may find another cultural 
belief  among the Madurese community something related to the 
concept of  self-esteem or honor deeply rooted in the Madurese culture. 
In the context of  the conflict, the mainstream community accuses the 
Shi’ite community to have conducted the defamation of  religion. The 
mainstream community will defend whatever they believe as truth by 
doing anything necessary, including the violent ways, to defend their self-
esteem. Among the Madurese community, there is a common cultural 
belief  that “ango’a poteya tolang etembang potea mata” (it is better to have 
white bone [self-esteem and honor] rather than white eyes [disgrace]).34 
They defend their existing belief  because by bringing different cultural 
belief  system, the Shi’ite community is considered to have defamed the 
mainstream religious belief.
Viewed from the surface of  the structure, again, the cultural 
essentialist explanation above seems to be true. Viewed from the deeper 
structure, however, the cultural essentialist explanation might work only 
at the partial periphery of  the conflict. The deeper one is getting into, 
he/she will be struck by the fact that a broader structure is at work 
behind the conflict. Religious and theological argument forms only 
insignificant part in explaining the reality of  the conflict. What is meant 
by structure refers to an established mode of  production in the making 
of  religious tradition.35 One important element of  the established mode 
of  production is economy: the circulation of  money among the kiais/
religious men to whom the majority of  Madurese pay homage and full 
32 For a general survey on the perspective of  cultural essentialism in analyzing 
religion, see John Anderson, “Does God Matter, and If  So whose God? Religion and 
Democratization”, Democratization, vol. 11, no. 4 (2004), pp. 192–217.
33 A research project undertaken by Juhari, for instance, identifies 22 (twenty-
two) theological differences between the Shi’ah and Sunni which are believed as the 
major factor stimulating the conflict; Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, pp. 129–31.
34 Wiyata, Carok, pp. 170–2.
35 For a good example of  the use of  “mode of  production” in analyzing religious 
issues, with particular reference to social conflict, see Otto Maduro, Religion and Social 
Conflicts:, trans. by Robert R. Barr (Oregon: Wipf  & Stock Publishers, 1982).
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respect. This is so because the religious men are mostly responsible as 
the sole agent in the production of  meaning among the lay community. 
As the cultural festivals are held throughout Islamic calendar of  
the whole year, a significant amount of  money is also circulated during 
particular months such as Rabi’ul Awwal in which everybody is celebrating 
the mawlid festival.36 In Sampang in particular, and Madura in general, 
where poverty and illiteracy are of  the major issue, symbolic activities 
become the benchmarking pattern for religious pietism. As if  there is no 
other alternative pattern of  interpretation outside of  that symbolic thread. 
As a result, everyone in the community, whether voluntarily or by force, 
would be affiliated with the standard of  symbolic pietism, regardless the 
cost that he/she must pay. In this context, the economic cost consumed 
for those festivals is something else. The point here is that how to put 
oneself  under the structure of  production mode and, thus, maintaining 
the concept self-esteem or honor appropriately.
As an illustration, in the Sub-District Omben, where the conflict 
exploded, the population counts 55.201.000 people with 16.936 heads of  
family (Kepala Keluarga/KK).37 If  one head of  family has to hold every 
festival during the mawlid season, for instance, there will be more than 
16.000 mawlid festivals during that month in one sub-district (Omben) 
alone! If  one head of  family must spend at least Rp 50.000,00 for a kiai, 
the mawlid festivals carried out by the whole heads of  family in Omben can 
cost Rp. 800.000.000,00.  If  one head of  family must pays Rp. 100.000,00 
for each kiai, there will be Rp. 1.600.000.000,00 circulated among the 
kiais. We can imagine how many more mawlid festivals outside of  the 
sub-district of  Omben and within the district of  Sampang which consists 
of  14 sub-districts? They will cost huge money for a single festival.38 
Within the spending list, the payment for kiai usually occupies 
only a tiny part of  total expenditure. The holders of  festivals must spend 
some more amount of  money for meals which are usually made from 
meat, beef  or lamb, of  flesh which are expensive. Therefore, it can be 
said that the families in Madura must spend a lot of  money for religious 
36 “Peringatan Maulid Nabi berlangsung Hingga Sebulan di Madura”, Republika 
Online (27 Jan 2013), http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-
nusantara/13/01/27/mha92r-peringatan-maulid-nabi-berlangsung-hingga-sebulan-
di-madura, accessed 14 Nov 2014.
37 Juhari, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura”, p. 100.
38 The regency of  Pamekasan has 13 sub-districts; Sumenep 27 sub-districts; 
Bangkalan 18 sub-districts. From this fact one can imagine the massiveness of  any 
religious festival held in Madura, especially in terms of  financial expenditure.
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festivals to please guests. Behind this tradition are of  course kiais, who 
defend the tradition sustained. It might be too naïve to argue that the 
kiais exist only for this purpose. Nevertheless, the association of  the 
kiais to all religious festivals is hardly separable. Both have created the 
flesh-and-blood structure within the landscape of  Muslim tradition in 
Madura. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration that the kiais are responsible 
for maintaining the established mode of  production by incorporating 
the religious meanings behind all cultural values on the one side and the 
religious festivals on the other side.
In addition to mawlid festivals, Madura has move religious festivals 
in the whole year. There are Isra’ Mi’raj festival, Ramadhan festival, nuzul 
al-Qur’an festival, Iedul Fitri and Iedul Adha festivals, and other rituals 
such as Slametan that invite kiais. The kiais lead the rituals or give religious 
sermons to the audience. This role cannot be replaced by lay persons 
because it needs delicate expertise owned by the kiais learnt them fin 
pesantren. This institution, therefore, creates the network for kiais, santris 
and graduates to maintain the established mode of  production.
Tajul Muluk wants to oppose (such a costly tradition). Thus, the 
resistance from the mainstream kiais had little to do with differences in 
theology and religious interpretation. It has been widely acknowledged 
that Shi’ah followers have been there in Madura for long time.39 They 
both coexist and the Shi’te followers do not bother the existing mode 
of  production in religious tradition. Furthermore, the mawlid festival is 
the prototype of  Shi’ite festival. They are also urged by the kiais to pay 
homage to the Prophet’s family. That is why a lot of  Madurese Muslims 
respect Arab descendants living in the island because most of  them tend 
to regard the later as the heirs of  the Prophet, at least in biological sense. 
By arguing that structure does matter in the production of  conflict, 
it does not mean that culture does not matter. The two are deployed 
altogether by the agent (kiais) in maintaining the established mode of  
production with its role and function. Both are constructed by the kiais 
that forms the underpinning structure of  cultural tradition in Madura, 
without which it can result in cultural turbulences that leads to social 
39 This is so because Shi’ah in Madura and Indonesia in general does not 
manifest itself  as the religious identity, but as a living tradition which is mixed with 
some Sunni tradition. The contest between the two manifests when Shi’ah becomes 
religious identity. For a further account on the ideological contest between Sunni and 
Shi’ah; Ali Hasymy, Syi’ah dan Ahlussunnah: Saling Rebut Pengaruh dan Kekuasaan Sejak Awal 
Sejarah Islam di Kepulauan Nusantara (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1983).
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disharmony. It is a matter of  fact that all religious festivals are already 
there in the configuration of  religious life in Madura before Tajul Muluk 
finally tried to bother the status-quo by introducing different tradition. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that the kiais should not be bothered by the 
existence of  Shi’ah so long as it does not shake the mode of  production.
The analysis of  economic dimension to the Shi’ah-Sunni conflict 
in Sampang, Madura, is reminiscent of  what Laurence R. Iannacone calls 
the rational choice approach to religion.40 In this context, Iannacone 
argues that: 
The combined actions of  religious consumers and religious producers 
form a religious market that, like other markets, tends toward a steady-
state equilibrium. As in other markets, the consumers’ freedom to 
choose constrains the producers of  religion. A “seller” (whether of  
automobiles or absolution) cannot long survive without the steady 
support of  “buyers” (whether money-paying customers, dues-paying 
members, contributors and coworkers, or governmental subsidizers). 
Consumer preferences thus shape the content of  religious commodities 
and the structure of  the institutions that provide them. These effects are 
felt more strongly where religion is less regulated and, as a consequence, 
competition among religious firms is more pronounced. In competitive 
environments, religions have little choice but to abandon inefficient modes 
of  production and unpopular products in favor of  more attractive and 
profitable alternatives.41
In relation to the Shi’ah-Sunni conflict in Sampang Madura, the 
existence of  Shi’ah posed threats to the “steady-state equilibrium” 
long constructed by the actors (kiais), i.e. the mainstream Sunni. In 
this context, the “new market” created by Tajul Muluk endangers that 
equilibrium and can dissolve long-established subscription of  “buyers.” 
In other words, the mainstream actors, i.e. kiais, are afraid of  losing 
their steady buyers, i.e. the followers of  Sunni. This means that the 
conflict between the two is about the conflict over membership. In a 
40 For a general survey on the economic approach to religion, see Laurence R. 
Iannaccone, “Introduction to the Economics of  Religion”, Journal of  Economic Literature, 
vol. 36, no. 3 (1998), pp. 1465–496; Rachel M. McCleary (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of  the Economics of  Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Larry Witham, 
Marketplace of  the Gods: How Economics Explains Religion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010); Robert Alan Segal, The Blackwell Companion to the Study of  Religion (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 47–68.
41 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational 
Choice Approach to Religion”, Journal for the Scientific Study of  Religion, vol. 34, no. 1 
(1995), p. 77.
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different formulation, Hamdi—following Lewis A. Coser’s theoretical 
framework—posits that the conflict reflects the claim of  religious 
authority, not the truth claim in theology.42 
The above excerpt also affirms that whenever religion is less 
regulated, it can create contest and competition. This confirms what is 
happening in this country that the status of  religion is not clearly regulated. 
The constitution indeed acknowledges sixth religions to exist (Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hindu, Buddhism, and Confucianism). This 
constitution, nevertheless, does not regulate as to what type of  sect within 
each religion can exist. The constitution of  UUD 1945 even explicitly 
sates that everyone is entitled to his/her right to embrace religion, and 
that the state guarantees that everyone may observe freely his/her own 
religious belief.43 The law does not regulates particular sect as forbidden. 
This constitution however creates ambiguity among the community. On 
the one hand the state does not forbid Shi’ah as it does not legalize Sunni 
alike, this sect does not seem to let to grow and develop further.
Using the economic approach to religion finally has something 
to do with the way one treats appropriately the combination of  
ideology and economy at one point which in turn forms structure. The 
combination of  two has proven to be “deadly cocktail” in every part 
of  the world. In such a combination, one should be aware of  the role 
played by each; who play what, where, when, and how?  The “deadly 
cocktail” in this context basically assumes the peripheral role played by 
the ideology, while the major driving force lies at the heart of  economy. 
Both form the flesh-and-blood or flesh-and-bone structure which is 
difficult to split to each other.
G. The Politics of  Conflict: Hostage of  Electoral Democracy
The Sunni-Shi’ah conflict has a political dimension, not because 
political factors play key a role in stimulating and escalating the conflict. 
Rather, the freedom of  religion and religious tolerance has become the 
hostage of  electoral politics at the local level. In the context of  Sunni-
Shi’ah conflict, the execution of  Shi’ite followers represents the violation 
of  the law, but the state could do nothing except taking side with the 
mainstream Sunni followers as the majority. As a result, the expulsion of  
Shi’ite followers outside of  Sampang cannot be avoided. They become 
42 Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, “Klaim Religious Authority dalam Konflik Sunni-
Syi‘i Sampang Madura”, Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman, vol. 6, no. 2 (2014), pp. 215–32.
43 Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) 1945, Article 28E, points (1) and (2).
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refugees housed in the stadium Sampang for 9 months.44 The local 
government as the representation of  the state could do nothing when 
the mainstream is not willing to accept the coming of  Shi’ite followers 
back home. More tragically, it has facilitated the expulsion of  Shi’te 
refugees into Sidoarjo. 
In an electoral democracy like in Indonesia the violation of  
freedom of  religion conducted by non-state actors can be seen as 
the act of  omission by the state. The case of  Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in 
Sampang seems to justify the violation of  this type. Indeed the state is 
not involved in the direct violation of  freedom of  religion. The state is 
inability to protect the rights of  minority group to observe and exercise 
their religious belief  can be considered as the violation of  the law. The 
siding of  the state with the majority group in persecuting the minority 
group can increase the degree of  violation from the act of  omission to 
the act of  commission where the state involvement in the exacerbation 
of  conflict is more visible. The Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang Madura 
can be seen from this perspective.
The political aspect of  the conflict starts from what is termed as 
“the law of  electoral exchange.” There is no direct transaction between 
the ruling elite and the ruled. The association between the voters and the 
voted can shape the state policy in favor of  the interests of  the voters. In 
this context, Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C. Müller argue that “Electoral 
exchange provides party leaders with votes, which they can cash in for 
policy or office benefits. Votes are the currency of  democratic politics, 
but their use and value depend on the rules by which other goods may 
be purchased. A variety of  political institutions shape the conversion of  
votes into spoils and policy influence.”45 
Madura in general, with particular reference to Sampang, has given 
significant contribution to the victory of  the current governor of  East 
Java, the pair Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf, in the first and second local 
elections in 2008 and 2013. During the first gubernatorial election in 2008, 
the Supreme Court of  Constitution decided to repeat the election three 
times in Sampang due to the accused violation done by the pair Soekarwo-
44 Saiful Bahri, “Kisah Miris Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Sambut Ramadan”, 
Tempo (20 Jul 2015), http://ramadan.tempo.co/read/news/2015/06/20/151676713/
kisah-miris-pengungsi-syiah-sampang-sambut-ramadan, accessed 16 Nov 2015.
45 Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom, Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political 
Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 21.
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Saifullah Yusuf. In both elections the pair Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf  was 
finally decided by the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU, Commission of  
General Election) as the winner over the pair Khofifah Indar-Parawansa-
Mujiono.46 The success story for the pair Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf  
repeats in the 2013 gubernatorial election which led them win over the 
pair Khofifah Indar Parawansa-Herman Surjadi Sumawiredja. 
In regards to the electoral contest, the question is: what is the role 
played by the local kiais and pesantren in both gubernatorial elections? 
It is undeniable that kiais and their institution, pesantren, have been the 
major reference in general election for the community in Madura.47 
Different from Java where the influence of  kiais in politics has been 
declining steadily, the kiais in Madura are still effective vote-getters in 
electoral politics. This is understandable due to the fact that the political 
culture in Madura adopts patrimonialistic pattern. In this situation, the 
relationship between the kiai and santri—as well as pesantren graduates—
forms patron-client relationship which assumes dependency upon one to 
another.48 The significance of  kiai in Madura is the explanation why this 
island has served as the “storehouse of  votes” for all politicians during 
the electoral contest.
In addition to electoral politics, the pair Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf  
has effectively utilized the bureaucracy machinery in the structure of  
local government. The case of  Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang has 
shown clearly that all bureaucratic apparatus—from the Regent, the head 
of  police, the domestic court, the Chairman of  parliament, the head 
of  Ministry for religious affairs, and the head of  Bakesbangpol—has 
been unified under the single interest of  the state at the upper level, i.e. 
the provincial government. It is highly unlikely that each of  these can 
negotiate with their superior in terms of  just law enforcement. Their 
institutional policies will reflect the wider interest of  esprit-de-corps: the 
state bureaucracy. 
From the description above, it is undeniable that the significance 
of  kiai in local politics of  Madura has paved the way for victory the pair 
Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf  as the governor and vice governor of  East 
46 Agus Setiawan, “KPU Jawa Timur Menangkan Karsa”, Antaranews (11 Dec 
2008), http://www.antaranews.com/berita/123586/kpu-jawa-timur-menangkan-karsa, 
accessed 15 Oct 2014.
47 “Ulama Masih Jadi Rujukan Pemilih di Jatim”, Kompas (27 Aug 2013), http://
regional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/27/0958561/Ulama.Masih.Jadi.Rujukan.Pemilih.
di.Jatim, accessed 29 Oct 2015.
48 Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah”, p. 84.
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Java. As a part of  political “compensation,” the governor will always 
take seriously all kiai’s grievances, including their interests in terms of  
Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in Sampang. This means that whoever becomes 
the majority in Madura will decide the ending result of  the conflict. As 
we have already known, the result tends to be Sunni kiai-heavy, in the 
sense that politics is the main reason why the government or the state 
has opted to take side with the local Sunni kiais rather than with the 
Shi’ah community. The combination of  local or religious leaders such 
as kiai and the government agents in electoral politics has formed what 
one refers to as “the marriage convenience” between the two.
H. Concluding Remarks
This paper has demonstrated that the Sunni-Shi’ah conflict in 
Sampang Madura has a strong political-economy dimension. The conflict 
can be seen as the way the local elites maintain the established mode 
of  production: economy, politics, culture, and symbols. This mode of  
production has created the state of  equilibrium in the society. In this case, 
kiais are the “sellers” whose religious ideas and practices are bought by 
the “buyers,” i.e. the lay community. All religious festivals are among the 
“products” that the kiais sell to the community. It is within this context 
that the existence of  Shi’ah community in Sampang is regarded by the 
mainstream Sunni community as a threat to their long domination over 
the socio-political structure in Madura because Tajul Muluk as the leader 
of  Shi’ah community offers a different product with more efficient way 
in holding festival celebration within one village mosque. 
Furthermore, the conflict is part of  a larger scheme of  electoral 
politics at the expense of  the state’s omission act towards the violation 
of  freedom of  religion which in the end favors the mainstream Sunni 
community. The conflict justifies the “electoral exchange” theory between 
the state apparatus and kiais as non-governing elite in Madura. The reason 
for the state’s political favoritism is clear: kiais in Madura are considered 
as the vote-gatherers who have paved the way for the victory of  existing 
governing elites, either at the provincial or at the local level . Despite the 
fact that politics is not the driving factor behind the conflict, it leads to an 
unjust treatment towards the Shi’ah community as the victim of  conflict.
49Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H
The Political Economy of  Sunni-Shi’ah Conflict in Sampang Madura
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, John, “Does God Matter, and If  So whose God? Religion and 
Democratization”, Democratization, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, pp. 192–217 
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135103404000236817].
Arifin, Syamsul and Muhammad Junaedi, “Konstruksi Sosial Masyarakat 
Syi’ah dan Sunni di Sampang, Madura”, in Hak Asasi Manusia untuk 
Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan di Indonesia: Keniscayaan, Kenyataan 
dan Penguatan, ed. by Syamsul Arifin, Madang: Pusat Studi Agama 
dan Multikulturalisme [PUSAM] Program Pascasarjana UMM, 2014.
Bahri, Saiful, “Kisah Miris Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Sambut Ramadan”, 
Tempo Ramadan, 20 Jul 2015, http://ramadan.tempo.co/read/
news/2015/06/20/151676713/kisah-miris-pengungsi-syiah-
sampang-sambut-ramadan, accessed 16 Nov 2015.
Biro Pusat Statistik, Sampang dalam Angka, Sampang: BPS Kab. Sampang, 
2008.
Hamdi, Ahmad Zainul, “Klaim Religious Authority dalam Konflik 
Sunni-Syi‘i Sampang Madura”, Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman, 
vol. 6, no. 2, 2014, pp. 215–31 [http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/
islamica.2012.6.2.215-231].
Hasymy, Ali, Syi’ah dan Ahlussunnah: Saling Rebut Pengaruh dan Kekuasaan 
Sejak Awal Sejarah Islam di Kepulauan Nusantara, Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 
1983.
Iannaccone, Laurence R., “Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational 
Choice Approach to Religion”, Journal for the Scientific Study of  Religion, 
vol. 34, no. 1, 1995, pp. 76–88 [http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1386524].
----, “Introduction to the Economics of  Religion”, Journal of  Economic 
Literature, vol. 36, no. 3, 1998, pp. 1465–95.
Jatim, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah Sampang Madura: Telaah Fenomenologis 
terhadap Patrimonialisme Budaya Politik”, Master Thesis, Surabaya: 
UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2014, http://digilib.uinsby.ac.id/1328/, 
accessed 28 Sep 2015.
Jonge, Huub de, Garam, Kekerasan dan Aduan Sapi: Esai-esai tentang Oang 
Madura dan Kebudayaan Madura, Yogyakarta: LKiS Group, 2012.
Juhari, Imam Bonjol, “Gerakan Sosial Islam Madura: Studi Gerakan 
Protes Islam Sunni terhadap Ideologi Syi’ah di Sampang”, Master 
Thesis, Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2014, http://digilib.
50 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H
Masdar Hilmy
uinsby.ac.id/1213/, accessed 28 Sep 2015.
“Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi’ah Sampang”, 
Report, Surabaya: Kontras, http://kontras.org/data/Laporan%20
Investigasi%20Syiah%20di%20Sampang.pdf, accessed 17 Sep 2015.
Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940, 
Jogjakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002.
Maduro, Otto, Religion and Social Conflicts, trans. by Robert R. Barr, Oregon: 
Wipf  & Stock Publishers, 1982.
McCleary, Rachel M. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of  the Economics of  Religion, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Muliono, Slamet, Syi’ah dan Masyarakat Lokal Sampang: Studi tentang Militansi 
Pengungsi Syi’ah dan Dinamika Masyarakat Lokal Sampang, Unpublished 
research report, Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2014.
Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strom, Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political 
Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.
Pareto, Vilfredo, The Rise and Fall of  Elites: an Application of  Theoretical 
Sociology, New Brunswick and London: Bedminster Press, 1968.
“Peringatan Maulid Nabi berlangsung Hingga Sebulan di Madura”, 
Republika Online, 27 Jan 2013, http://khazanah.republika.co.id/
berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/13/01/27/mha92r-peringatan-
maulid-nabi-berlangsung-hingga-sebulan-di-madura, accessed 14 
Nov 2014.
Rozaki, Abdur, Menabur Kharisme Menuai Kuasa: Kiprah Kiai dan Blater 
sebagai Rezim Kembar di Madura, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa, 2004.
----, “The Social Origins and Political Power of  Blaters (Thugs) in 
Madura”, Kyoto Review of  Southeast Asia, 12 Nov 2009, http://
kyotoreview.org/issue-11/the-social-origins-and-political-power-
of-blaters-thugs-in-madura/, accessed 28 Oct 2015.
Segal, Robert Alan, The Blackwell Companion to the Study of  Religion, Oxford 
& Melbourne: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Setiawan, Agus, “KPU Jawa Timur Menangkan Karsa”, Antaranews, 11 
Dec 2008, http://www.antaranews.com/berita/123586/kpu-jawa-
timur-menangkan-karsa, accessed 15 Oct 2014.
“Ulama Masih Jadi Rujukan Pemilih di Jatim”, Kompas, 27 Aug 2013, 
http://regional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/27/0958561/Ulama.
51Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H
The Political Economy of  Sunni-Shi’ah Conflict in Sampang Madura
Masih.Jadi.Rujukan.Pemilih.di.Jatim, accessed 29 Oct 2015.
Weber, Max, On Charisma and Institution Building, ed. by S.N. Eisenstadt, 
Chicago: The Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1968.
Witham, Larry, Marketplace of  the Gods: How Economics Explains Religion, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Wiyata, A. Latief, Carok: Konflik Kekuasaan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura, 
Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002.
